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Mussolini of Yugoslavia? The Milan Stojadinović regime and the impact 
of Italian fascism, 1937-1939
di Dragan Bakić
The Yugoslav prime minister (and foreign minister), Milan Stojadinović, and Italian 
foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, signed a friendship agreement on 25 March 1937, 
ushering in an atmosphere of confidence between the two formerly hostile countries. 
This rapprochement resulted from the changing international constellation: the re-
surgent Germany was expected to annex Austria and become a powerful neighbour to 
both countries. Ciano and Stojadinović struck close personal relations which no doubt 
buttressed the solidity of their agreement. Moreover, Ciano believed that Stojadinović 
was inclined towards authoritarian concept of power. There were also increasing signs 
that the Stojadinović regime was acquiring some fascist trappings in line with the new 
course of foreign policy. Indeed, Prince regent, Paul, dropped Stojadinović from the 
government in February 1939 because he came to believe that his premier was intent on 
becoming a fascist dictator. This paper will explore whether there was substance to the 
often repeated accusations that Stojadinović was sliding towards fascism. Much of these 
accusations were centred on his foreign policy, especially his cordial relations with the 
fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. Therefore, this paper 
will analyse, on the one hand, to what extent Stojadinović aligned Yugoslavia’s conduct 
of foreign affairs with Rome’s foreign policy and, on the other, to what degree the Yugo-
slav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in internal developments which might smack 
of fascism. The analysis will be undertaken with reference to the recent and influential 
theories of fascism. 
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«If the Danubian States begin now to put on the Nazi garb, it will be because 
imitation is the sincerest form of flattery and because they want to ingratiate them-
selves in time with their future master»1. This is how Sir Orme Sargent, an assistant 
under-secretary in the Foreign Office, explained the strengthening of authoritarian 
tendencies in Danubian Europe in the late 1930s when the rise of the Iron Guard 
in Romania and what the British saw as the increasing propensity for totalitarian 
methods of the Milan Stojadinović government in Yugoslavia occasioned a debate 
among diplomats and Whitehall officials. For Sargent then, it was the expediency 
of foreign policy, namely the inevitable German domination over the region, that 
largely propelled the smaller states in south-eastern Europe to acquire some fascist 
trappings. This line of thinking, however, has not been fully examined in historiog-
1 The National Archives, UK, Foreign Office Records, General Correspondence, R 8788/162/37, FO 371/21189, 
Sargent minute, 1-1-1938.




raphy and the references to geopolitical requirements as a reason for Stojadinović’s 
policy have often had an air of dismissiveness.  
But it was perhaps the more apparent relations with fascist Italy based on a for-
mal treaty rather than his links with Berlin that accounted for the accusations which 
many contemporaries levelled at Stojadinović and which later spilled into histori-
ography. These relations earned him, to a large extent, the reputation of a fascist-in-
the-making responsible for the shift in Belgrade’s conduct of external affairs from 
supporting Western democracies to collaborating with the Axis Powers, a common 
place in the historiography of communist Yugoslavia2. Such interpretation of his 
premiership has survived to this day, perhaps more in public discourse than among 
professional historians. An important exception in the old Yugoslav historiography 
insofar as it is reserved towards the routine classification of Stojadinović in the fas-
cist camp is a thorough study of the circumstances leading to his fall3. The American 
historian of Slovene origin has portrayed him as an exceedingly ambitious politi-
cian who resorted to fascist methods to establish his dictatorship4. Italian histori-
ography has tended, not unnaturally, to perceive Stojadinović through the lenses of 
Mussolini’s foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, assessment of Stojadinović’s fascist 
affinities5. On the other hand, the Yugoslav prime minister’s has been described as 
a «political opportunist» who gambled on Nazi Germany’s market for economic 
benefit6. A more recent assessment has also come to the conclusion that there is no 
ground to consider Stojadinović a fascist dictator, but this piece has failed, despite 
its focus on ideology, to explore fully the fascist trappings of the later phase of his 
power-holding7. 
This paper will discuss whether there was substance to the view that Stojadinović 
was increasingly sliding towards fascism with special reference to his cordial rela-
tions with the fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. 
In order to do so, this essay will analyse, on the one hand, what was the extent 
to which Stojadinović aligned his conduct of foreign affairs with Rome’s foreign 
policy and, on the other, to what degree the rapprochement with Italy was reflected 
2 For example, F. Čulinović, Jugoslavija između dva rata, v. 2, Jugoslavenske akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 
Zagreb 1961, pp. 113-118; D. Lukač, Treći Rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope, v. 2, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd 
1982, pp. 133-134; V. Terzić, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941: uzroci i posledice poraza, v. 1, Narodna knjiga, 
Beograd 1984, p. 224; B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988, v. 1, Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1914-1941, 
Nolit, Beograd 1988, pp. 285-286.
3 D. Biber, O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade, in «Istorija 20. veka », v. 8, 1966, pp. 5-71.
4 J. Hoptner, Jugoslavija u krizi 1934-1941, Otokar Keršovani, Rijeka 1972, pp. 121, 144-145 (Serbo-Croat edi-
tion of J.B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941, Columbia University Press, New York 1962).
5 For example, L. Monzali, Il sogno dell’egemonia. L’Italia, la questione jugoslava e l’Europa Centrale (1918-
1941), Le Lettere, Firenze 2010, p. 69; G.B. Guerri, Galeazzo Ciano. Una vita (1903-1944), La Nave di Teseo, 
Milano 2019, p. 277.
6 J. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, 
pp. 183-185.
7 D. Djokić, ‘Leader’ or ‘Devil’? Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia (1935-39) and his Ideology, 
in In the shadow of Hitler: Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. R. Haynes, M. Rady, 
Tauris Academic Studies, London 2011, pp. 153-168.
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in Yugoslavia’s internal developments which might smack of fascism, especially 
the organisation and activities of his political party, the Yugoslav Radical Union 
(JRZ)8. The analysis will be an empirical one, but it will also relate its findings to 
the influential theories which dominate the fascism studies and try to assess how the 
case in question can contribute to wider considerations in that vibrant field.
Milan Stojadinović and the Creation of the JRZ Regime
To begin with, it is necessary to sketch briefly Stojadinović’s background and 
the circumstances in which he found himself at the head of the Yugoslav govern-
ment. As a fairly young man he rose from the ranks of the People’s Radical Party 
led by Nikola Pašić, Serbia’s pre-1914 and Yugoslavia’s post-1918  prime minister 
and a legendary personality of Serbian politics. With reputation of a finance expert 
Stojadinović became a finance minister in Pašić’s cabinet (December 1922 - April 
1926) and proved his abilities by managing to stabilise dinar, the faltering Yugoslav 
currency, and eliminating the budget deficit9. Following Pašić’s death in 1926, his 
party splintered into factions and was officially dissolved after the introduction of 
King Alexander’s dictatorship in 1929, along with all other political parties. King 
Alexander attempted to forcefully suppress the conflict between the Serbs and Cro-
ats by promoting the ideology of integral Yugoslavism – he forbade manifestations 
of the separate Serb, Croat and Slovene identity in favour of the common Yugoslav 
nationality. While the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) was interested in struggling 
for an autonomous Croatia rather than political liberties, the Serbian opposition 
parties rose against the suppression of parliamentary democracy. Contrary to the 
recent claim that he was inactive10, Stojadinović was perhaps the most agile mem-
ber of the Main Committee of his Radical Party in organising a united opposition 
to the royal dictatorship. He was especially engaged in keeping contact with the 
leadership of the Independent Democratic Party, a coalition partner of the HSS 
which mostly gathered the Serbs from Croatia, in a bid to reach an agreement with 
Vladimir Maček, the president of HSS11. It was a measure of his involvement in the 
8 There is a number of works dealing with Yugoslav-Italian relations in interwar period, including the Stojadinović 
era, cited throughout this article. Of special interest for the issues scrutinised here are: T. Stojkov, Vlada Milana 
Stojadinovića, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1985 unfinished due to the death of the author; D. Tešić, Ju-
goslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1995; and the most recent, 
B. Simić, Milan Stojadinović i Italija: između diplomatije i propagande, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd 2019.
9 B. Mijatović, Ekonomske ideje i dela Milana Stojadinovića u prvom periodu rada, in Milan Stojadinović: politi-
ka u vreme globalnih lomova, ur. M. Đurković, Službeni glasnik i Centar za konzervativne studije, Beograd 2012, 
pp. 101-123; D. Gnjatović, Evolution of Economic Thought on Monetary Reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes after the Great War, in «Balcanica», v. 51, 2020, pp. 183-205.
10 B. Simić, Milan Stojadinović i Italija, cit., p. 17.
11 Lj. Boban, Držanje srbijanskih opozicionih stranaka povodom Zagrebačkih punktacija (1932-33), in «Histo-
rijski zbornik», n. 1-4, 1962, pp. 1-40; id., Geneza, značenje i odjek Zagrebačkih punktacija, in «Časopis za 
suvremenu povijest», n. 1, 1971, pp. 153-209; T. Stojkov, Opozicija u vreme šestojanuarske diktature 1929-1935., 
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anti-regime activities that the police searched both his house and office to find some 
leaflets which were believed to have been authored by him12. He also distinguished 
himself during this time by penning an article in which he argued for establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on both economic and political grounds, 
a view that stood out in the visceral anti-communist atmosphere of the official Bel-
grade13. This reflected his pragmatic realpolitik view of foreign relations, with no 
place for ideological dogmatism, which was reminiscent of Pašić’s realism. But 
most importantly, it was during this time that Stojadinović struck friendship with 
Prince Paul, a first cousin of King Alexander, a democratically-minded Anglophile 
and an art connoisseur, who would soon come to play a paramount role in the coun-
try. According to Stojadinović’s memoirs, their befriending owed a great deal to 
the fact that both were good friends with Sir Nevile Henderson, British minister in 
Belgrade14.    
After the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in October 1934, Prince 
Paul became regent until Petar II had come of age. Paul insisted that Stojadinović 
become a finance minister in the Boško Jevtić cabinet which proved incapable of 
dealing with national and social tensions in Yugoslavia. Having brought about a 
crisis of the cabinet, Paul handed a mandate to Stojadinović who formed his cabinet 
on 24 June 1935. It was a coalition consisting of Anton Korošec’s Slovenian Peo-
ple’s Party, Mehmed Spaho’s Yugoslav Muslim Organisation and Radicals, widely 
regarded as the most influential Serbian party. This combination was another vari-
ant of a governmental party formed from above, not unlike the Yugoslav National 
Party which had underpinned the royal dictatorship, but it was different insofar as 
it assembled the legitimate representatives of Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims and, 
at least, of a considerable number of Serbs. Stojadinović was thus supposed to be a 
legitimate voice for the Serbs and, as such, in a position to negotiate with authority 
with Maček to find a solution for the Croat grievances. The governmental formula 
was replicated in the creation of the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ) in September 
that year which was effectively a coalition of Korošec’s and Spaho’s parties with 
Radicals rather than a single unified political organisation.  
But Stojadinović fell out with the Radical Main Committee as early as December 
1936: he wanted to be a true head of both the government and JRZ, while they envis-
aged him as a mere spokesman for the Radical leadership15. In what was pre-1914 
Serbia, the rift between Stojadinović’s supporters and Radicals loyal to the Main 
Committee turned into a battle for Pašić’s succession. Đurđina Pašić, a widow of 
the grand old man, sent a letter to Stojadinović stating that she knew how Pašić had 
respected him and believed he would be his successor. The letter was published in 
Prosveta, Beograd 1969, pp. 228-229, 231, 241, 246-247, 256-257, 266, 270.
12 Historical Archive of the City of Belgrade, Kosta St. Pavlović, Beleške 1933, entry for 19-04-1933.
13 M. Stojadinović, Šta je rukovodilo Sjedinjene Američke Države da priznaju Sovjete, in «Politika», 6 January 
1934, p. 15.
14 Id., Ni rat ni pakt: Jugoslavija između dva rata, El Economista, Buenos Aires 1963, pp. 291-298.
15 T. Stojkov, Vlada Milana Stojadinovića, cit., pp. 90-114.
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«Samouprava», the JRZ newspaper16. Significantly, this episode was part of the events 
surrounding the marking of ten years since Pašić’s death which JRZ used to promote 
itself as his sole heir and the guardian of his policy. On that occasion, the JRZ also 
published a book on Pašić under the guidance of the editor of «Samouprava», Milan 
Jovanović-Stoimirović17. For the Radical Main Committee, the letter of Mrs. Pašić 
was a blow and they were even reluctant to turn up at the commemoration. She had 
to write a letter to Aca Stanojević, the president of the Main Committee and an old 
friend of her husband, to beseach him to make an appeareance at the church, and im-
plicitly denied the veracity of what had been published in «Samouprava» by insisting 
that the late Pašić had never talked politics with her18. In fact, Pašić never designated 
his successor. He was one of those leaders whose life was inseparable from politics 
and who could not imagine himself in retirement; after all, he died at the age of eighty 
while trying to get another mandate from King Alexander to form a cabinet.   
Most of Serbia’s Radicals joined Stojadinović, not least because of the govern-
ment privileges. In other Yugoslav provinces, the outcome very much depended 
on the local conditions. In northern Dalmatia, Niko Novaković, a member of par-
liament, swayed Radicals on the side of JRZ19. The vast majority of Serbs there, 
and in some regions of Croatia, closed their ranks in JRZ because they felt threat-
ened by anti-Yugoslav and Serbophobe attitude of the Croats20. It was different 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, where Spaho was able to capitalise on his 
participation in the Belgrade government to the benefit of local Muslims’ interests. 
The formation of the JRZ branches met with difficulties, since there was distrust 
between Radicals and Spaho’s supporters21. For example, a leader of Radicals from 
the town of Brčko complained that an anti-Serbian regime was established in his 
county as the local Muslim leadership replaced decent Serbian officials with the 
Croats who were known to have been inimical to the Yugoslav state22. Stressing 
how the local Serbs in a small town in Herzegovina resented JRZ for favouring 
Muslims over themselves, a prominent Radical from Stolac was adamant that none 
of them would support it, «because defending JRZ among us is the same as con-
verting to Turkish [Muslim] religion!»23. In Slovenia, the number of Serbs, and by 
extension Radicals, was negligent and that province was an absolute preserve of 
Korošec. Overall, the rift with the senior Radical figures weakened Stojadinović 
vis-à-vis the undisputed Slovene and Bosnian Muslim leaders. In reality, his au-
thority solely rested on the confidence Prince Paul placed in him. A logical rami-
fication of such a position was that the JRZ was run by the Stojadinović-Korošec-
16 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik 1936-1941, Matica srpska, Novi Sad 2000, p. 90.
17 Nikola P. Pašić: povodom desetogodišnjice Pašićeve smrti, Redakcija Samouprave, Beograd 1937.
18 Аrchives of Yugoslavia (AJ), Lazar Marković Papers, fond no. 85, box 2, f. 6 (hereafter 85-2-6), Đurđina Pašić 
to  Aca Stanojević, 9-12-1936.
19 АЈ, 85-2-6, Ljuba Jurković to Lazar Marković, 16-4-1936.
20 АЈ, 85-2-6, Ljuba Jurković to Lazar Marković, 22-5-1936.
21 AJ, 85-2-6, Mehmed Alija Hodžić to Lazar Marković, Konjic, 7-12-1935.
22 T. Stojkov, Vlada Milana Stojadinovića, cit., p. 82.
23 АЈ, 85-2-6, Miho Mihić to Lazar Marković, Stolac, 25-4-1936.
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Spaho triumvirate and the prime minister exercised real control over the Serbian 
members of the party alone.      
The newly-minted JRZ adopted a political programme typical of a conservative 
party which operated within the framework of parliamentary democracy, although 
Yugoslavia certainly remained an authoritarian state24. The legislation and constitu-
tion introduced during Alexander’s dictatorship was still in force, but the Stojadinović 
government brought about considerable change. In practice, the oppressive regime 
was abandoned; after releasing political prisoners, the old political parties were al-
lowed to resume their activities in a relatively free manner. Moreover, the JRZ pre-
sented itself, and was generally perceived, as a moderate conservative constituency 
which had done away with the dictatorial regime of the Yugoslav nationalists. In 
parallel, it tacitly dropped the integral Yugoslavism and returned the concept of the 
three constituent “tribes” of a single nation in public discourse, whereas the adher-
ence to a unitary state remained, albeit with the hint at local autonomies to placate 
the Croats25. The watchword was the need to calm down the passions in the country 
as a prelude to settling the thorny issues, primarily the Croat discontent. 
Initially at least, the JRZ leadership underscored their democratic credentials. 
In a registration form submitted to the Ministry of Interior Affairs in late August 
1935, the point was made that membership in the party would not be allowed to 
“Yugo-fascists” alone, a reference to the prominent followers of the former prime 
minister, Bogoljub Jevtić26. In a similar strain, during a speech in parliament in mid-
March 1936, in which he denied the accusations of having abandoned the ideology 
of integral Yugoslavism and unitary state, Stojadinović stated that it was not true 
that the JRZ was demobilising national energies, «except those Yugo-fascist forces, 
which authorised themselves in the national assembly to be the only protector of the 
state and national unity»27. This was consistent with the instructions he had given a 
month earlier to Jovanović-Stoimirović for publication of the first issue of the re-
vamped «Samouprava»: «All that is anti-democratic and fascist – condemn»28. On 
the other hand, the leader of the extreme far-right party known as Borbaši, Svetislav 
Hođera, noted that the JRZ labelled all their political opponents either communists 
or fascists29. Nonetheless, the disrepute of the Yugoslav nationalists and the extrem-
ism of both left- and right-wing fringe political parties boosted the JRZ’s image 
as a moderate conservative alternative, even among the opposition. For example, 
Dragoljub Jovanović, the leader of the left-wing Agrarians, warned that «the hydra 
of the Jevtić regime» had not died as yet and «various fascist elements» were rais-
24 Program i statut Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice, Štamparija ‘Privreda’, Beograd 1935. 
25 AJ, Milan Stojadinović Papers, 37-1-4, The Declaration of Stojadinović, Korošec and Spaho, undated but likely 
from June 1935, scans. 16-17. It is published in an abridged form, without the important part indicating the depar-
ture from integral Yugoslavism, in Jugoslovenski federalizam: ideje i stvarnost-tematska zbirka dokumenata, v. 1, 
1914-1943, ur. B. Petranović, M. Zečević, Prosveta, Beograd 1987, pp. 338-339.
26 D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, cit., p. 43 fn. 68.
27 Ivi, p. 98, fn. 102.
28 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 37.
29 D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, cit., p. 160.
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ing their heads, stressing that the opposition would stand by the government in the 
defence of democratic freedoms30.    
Such an image of Stojadinović was facilitated by the failed attempt on his life 
in the midst of parliament on 6 March 1936. The shooter was a member of parlia-
ment and a supporter of Jevtić. It was widely regarded that Jevtić and General 
Petar Živković, the main pillar of King Alexander’s dictatorship and currently the 
army minister in Stojadinović’s cabinet, were behind the assassination attempt. 
This belief boosted Stojadinović’s popularity and made him, at least temporarily, 
«a symbol of the spirit of the people in the struggle between the democratic idea 
and dictatorship»31. The most important political consequence of the affair was that 
General Živković was dropped from the cabinet, which further shored up the prime 
minister’s prestige. On the other hand, Stojadinović did not fulfil his promise to 
hold a truly free elections under the newly-introduced democratic legislation in the 
not so distant future. This undermined his democratic credentials, along with his 
continued use of the government apparatus for the purpose of consolidating JRZ. 
The reason for his reneging in this respect was one of expediency rather than of 
principle: he and his political allies needed time to complete the organisation of JRZ 
before testing its strength at the poll. This contradiction made it somewhat difficult 
to place the JRZ on the political spectrum. Having been asked by his own chief 
propagandist whether the regime was moving to the right or to the left, Stojadinović 
replied through laughter: «Democratie dirigée»32.
Stojadinović, Ciano and Italo-Yugoslav Relations
In foreign policy, Prince Paul and Stojadinović sought security for Yugoslavia, es-
pecially against Italy’s aspirations on the Yugoslav territory. Mussolini’s aggression 
against Abyssinia in fall 1935 directed Italian expansionism towards Africa rather 
than the Balkans, but it laid bare the impotence of both the League of  Nations and 
the collective security. It was clear to policy-makers in Belgrade that France and 
Britain would provide no effective military assistance in case of a war arising from 
the League-imposed sanctions against Italy33. The German remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland in March 1936 demonstrated that the traditional French friendship could 
not be counted on in Belgrade’s hour of need. Stojadinović was aware of the growing 
German power and made an effort to establish good relations with Berlin. In Decem-
ber 1935, the Yugoslav minister declared to Hitler that his country would not be part 
30 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-60, A speech prepared for the opposition rally, 19-10-1935.
31 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 42. For details on the failed attempt, see B. Simić, Atentat u Na-
rodnoj skupštini marta 1936. godine-pozadina, sudski proces, posledice, in «Nauka i savremeni univerzitet», n. 
9, 2020, pp. 163-174.
32 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 161.
33 Ž. Avramovski, Pitanje učešća Jugoslavije u vojnim sankcijama protiv Italije za vreme italijanske agresije na 
Etiopiju (1935-1936), in «Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis», n. 1, 1964, pp. 13-36.
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of any anti-German political combinations34. After all, the two countries were not 
conterminous and had no outstanding issues, both were opposed to the Habsburg res-
toration in Austria and their trade was on the rise. Moreover, Yugoslavia had special 
geostrategic importance for Germany as it was the linchpin of the Balkans to which 
Berlin directed its economic and political expansion. This was Göring’s motivation 
for an overture to Belgrade to the effect that Germany was prepared to guarantee 
Yugoslavia against both revisionist Hungary and Italy. For Stojadinović, German 
friendship was essential in view of the necessity to keep in check Italian danger, a 
role which France was no longer willing and able to perform. As he explained to 
Prince Paul, «For the sake of our tranquillity and securing the future of Yugoslavia, 
we must find an insurance against Italy as soon as possible»35. 
The Germans suggested to the Italian foreign minister, Ciano, during his visit in 
October 1936 in which the Axis was born, an Italo-Yugoslav rapprochment to wrest 
Belgrade away from British influence. In fact, Germany needed the break-up of the 
Little Entente to isolate Czechoslovakia36. But Italy was not entirely sincere with 
Berlin either. Although Hiler declared that the Mediterranean was Rome’s sphere 
of interest, the Italians were concerned about Germany’s plans to annex Austria and 
seek an outlet to the Adriatic. They wanted the destruction of the Little Entente to 
remove French influence and establish their own predominance over the Balkans 
and the Danube basin, but it was their fear of the overwhelming German might that 
prompted them to seek an understanding with Belgrade37. This was the rationale 
behind the conclusion of the Italo-Yugoslav pact of friendship on 25 March 1937. 
Stojadinović scored a success, since Italy made major concessions ‒ a guarantee of 
Yugoslavia’s borders, confinement of the Croat Ustasha terrorists who had found 
refuge in Italy and been responsible for the murder of King Alexander, maintaining 
Albania’s independence and improvement in the treatment of the Yugoslav (Slo-
vene and Croat) national minority38. In addition, the agreement cut the ground from 
any potential attempt of the HSS to internationalise the Croat question and strength-
ened the government in their negotiations with Maček39.  
34 B. Krizman, Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918-1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled, Školska knjiga, 
Zagreb 1975, p. 84.
35 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 12-06-1936, scan 329.
36 V. Vučković, Politika Osovine prema Jugoslaviji (1936-1941), in «Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pra-
vo», n. 2, 1954, pp. 23-43; B. Krizman, Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918-1941), in «Časopis 
za suvremenu povijest», n. 1, 1975, pp. 33-97.
37 On Italian motives, see A. Breccia, Jugoslavia, 1939-1941. Diplomazia della neutralità, Giuffrè, Milano 1978, 
ch. 1; M. Bucarelli, Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922-1939), B.A. Graphis, Bari 2006, pp. 327-383; G.B. Strang, 
On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War, CT, Westport 2003, pp. 76-79.
38 For an account of the negotiations leading to the Pact of Belgrade, see Ž. Avramovski, Balkanske zemlje i velike 
sile, 1935-1937.: od italijanske agresije na Etiopiju do jugoslovensko-italijanskog pakta, Prosveta, Beograd 1968, 
pp. 261-292; J. Hoptner, Yugoslavia as Neutralist: 1937, in «Journal of Central European Affairs», n. 2, 1956, 
pp. 156-76; E. Milak, Italija I Jugoslavija 1931-1927, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1937, pp. 132-141.
39 S. Trifković, Milan Stojadinović, Italija i hrvatsko pitanje, in Milan Stojadinović: politika u vreme globalnih 
lomova, cit., pp. 75-84; D. Bakić, Milan Stojadinović, the Croat Question and the International Position of Yugo-
slavia, in «Acta Histriae», n. 1, 2018, pp. 207-228.
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To highlight the importance attached to his diplomatic move, Ciano personally 
came to Belgrade to sign the treaty with Stojadinović. During the first of their four 
face-to-face meetings they established cordial personal relations which set the tone 
for Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement over the next two years. Stojadinović stated his 
views as to Yugoslavia’s position and future developments: he intended to confine 
himself to the Balkans rather than pursue a European policy; relations with Italy 
would assume principal importance whereas those with France were weakened – 
he would openly reject the French proposal for the conclusion of a military alli-
ance with the Little Entente countries aimed to defend Czechoslovakia from Ger-
many; moreover, Stojadinović found the Anschluss inevitable and he was certain 
that Beneš “would find himself alone” in case of a German action. Importantly, 
Stojadinović couched his assertions in the language designed to appeal to a fascist 
foreign minister. For example, he did not fail to dismiss the cultural influence on 
Yugoslavia «of the Jewish, Masonic and Communistic mentality of […] France», 
or to point out the particular peril of Bolshevik propaganda among his countrymen 
due to the closeness with the Russians in terms of race, language and temperament. 
This apparently accounted for Ciano’s impression that Stojadinović was a fascist 
«by virtue of his conception of authority, of the State and of life»40. 
With those strong impressions in view, Ciano would have been disappointed to 
learn of Stojadinović’s grand neutralist strategy for a war he knew was coming. 
The latter mused in June 1937, two and a half months after the conclusion of the 
Pact of Belgrade, that «we have to try to remain neutral until the last moment and 
to preserve strength until after the war, so that we could dictate our demands to 
the weakened world». In order to do so, he found it necessary to keep in balance 
relations with all powers. But he was in no doubt from which quarters Yugoslavia 
faced danger: «Our eventual opponents in the first future war are Germany or Italy. 
[…] We cannot afford ourselves today the luxury of someone’s enmity. We have to 
weigh carefully our every word. And what is cardinal and fundamental, we must 
not declare ourselves in a future war before Italy [has done so]»41. Stojadinović was 
clearly far from being as honest with Ciano as the Italian came to believe.  
To reinforce his neutralist policy, Stojadinović undertook a diplomatic tour of 
Paris, London and Rome in late 1937. In the first two capitals he made an effort 
to dispel the growing doubts that he was going too far in his relations with the 
Axis. Stojadinović renewed the 1927 friendship treaty with France, but he reso-
lutely refused the repeated French offer to conclude a mutual assistance pact be-
tween France and the Little Entente countries. Having been criticised for the Italian 
treaty, he assured Yvon Delbos, French foreign minister, that Yugoslavia was firmly 
attached to France, the Little and Balkan Ententes but she was a mouse caught be-
tween two cats, Germany and Italy, and must deal with them carefully to avoid the 
fate of Abyssinia and Spain42. Stojadinović then arrived in Italy to return Ciano’s 
40 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, ed. M. Muggeridge, Odhams Press, London 1948, pp. 98-105.
41 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., pp. 133-138.
42 V. Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva rata (Da li je Jugoslavija bila francuski “satelit”), Institut za 
savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1985, p. 356.
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visit and meet the Duce for the first time (5-9 December). In conversations with the 
Italian statesmen, he modified his account of the visits to France and Britan and the 
direction of Yugoslav policy to their liking. He had no qualms about playing the 
ideological card, stating that he was engaged in formation «of a large party which 
will have as its chief aim the organisation of Yugoslav youth. All that will produce 
an increasingly marked approach to the political system formed by the authoritarian 
countries and a break away from France»43. Even more typical of Stojadinović’s tac-
tics was the manner in which he handled two issues which were central to the Axis’s 
approach to drawing the smaller powers into their own orbit, namely demands for 
leaving the League of Nations and joining the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded be-
tween Germany, Japan and Italy in 1936-1937. After Mussolini had offered him 
to postpone the announcement of Italy’s withdrawal from the League so as not to 
coincide with Stojadinović’s visit and cause harmful polemics, the Yugoslav prime 
minister said he would write himself a commentary on the League’s lack of pur-
pose following Italy’s exit. In fact, he deceived the Duce about his dismissal of the 
Geneva organisation. Just two weeks later, Stojadinović informed his diplomatic 
representatives that Yugoslavia would remain a member of the League because that 
was necessary to keep on good terms with all the great powers, a veiled reference 
to France and Britain44. He was also determined to keep Yugoslavia out of the Anti-
Comintern Pact, since adhering to it would have placed Belgrade on the side of the 
Axis. He instructed the press to explain that Yugoslavia refused to join either of the 
two ideological blocs in Europe45.  
What emerged most clearly from Stojadinović’s visit was the extent to which 
Ciano was convinced both in his fascist proclivities and in the great prospects of 
cooperation between their countries. He believed that Stojadinović returned «home 
to form the base of his dictatorship Party» using the «Mussolini formula» and found 
their conversations «fundamental for an alliance, which could be used in many differ-
ent directions. One day, maybe, also towards the north [Germany]»46. But all along, 
Stojadinović paid special attention to his relations with Germany. Despite paying 
lip service to Ciano, reminding him that the Rome-Belgrade axis would come into 
operation if Germany went too far, he regarded Berlin as a counterweight against an-
other Italian change of policy. Stojadinović admitted to Konstantin von Neurath, Ger-
man foreign minister, during his visit to Belgrade in June 1937 that the guns on the 
Yugoslav side of the Adriatic were not removed47. Two considerations were central to 
Stojadinović’s view of Yugoslavia’s position vis-à-vis Germany and Italy. He did not 
43 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, cit., pp. 149-152. For Stojadinović’s account, see Ni rat ni pakt, cit., pp. 478-485.
44 D. Lukač, Treći Rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope, II, cit., p. 130.
45 B. Simić, Milan Stojadinović i Italija, cit., p. 112.
46 Ciano’s Diary, Phoenix Press, London 2002, p. 34. It seems that Stojadinović, partly at least, won Ciano’s con-
fidence on the cheap. The Italian, for example, believed that the former started to «enjoy the idea of dictatorship» 
because he «adopted the Roman salute and wears his coat inside out showing the suede lining because it is “more 
military”». See ivi, p. 33. 
47 D. Denda, Šlem i šajkača: vojni faktor i jugoslovensko-nemački odnosi, Matica srpska, Novi Sad 2019, pp. 
272-277.
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believe in the sincere and durable Italo-German collaboration given the conflicting 
interests of the Axis powers in south-eastern Europe. And he had no doubt that Ger-
many was the paramount political factor in the region on which both the security of 
Yugoslavia’s borders and the upper hand of the Belgrade government in dealing with 
the Croats hinged. Stojadinović later explained the substance of his policy as follows: 
«By sticking with Germany it was not necessary […] to make any concessions to the 
Croats […] The friendship with the Germans […] was sufficient to us Serbs to keep 
in check all our opponents in the Balkans, within and beyond the state borders»48. The 
Germans made much of Stojadinović’s visit to Berlin in January 1938, with Göring 
acting as his personal friend, not unlike Ciano in Italy. In line with his prediction 
of the future events, Stojadinović made it clear that he saw the Austrian issue as «a 
purely internal question of the German people»49. In return, Hitler solemnly declared 
that once the Anschluss had been completed he would consider Yugoslavia’s borders 
inviolable from not just the German, but also the Hungarian side. Stojadinović was 
thus completely calm when the Anschluss took place in March 1938.   
He was deeply concerned, however, about Berlin’s next move – the annexation of 
Czechoslovakia’s German-populated Sudeten area. The crux of the problem was that 
Hungary was anxious to exploit the crisis in order to take back as much territory as 
possible from what it had lost to Prague after the war. In case of a Hungarian attack on 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania were obliged under the terms of the Little 
Entente pact to rise to arms in defence of their ally. In Stojadinović’s view, the danger 
was that a European-scale conflagration could arise from the Czechoslovak crisis and 
that Yugoslavia could find herself ranged against Germany and, quite possibly, Italy, 
and risk her existence. To avoid such a disastrous development, the Yugoslav premier 
turned to Rome. Italy had long been a champion of the Hungarian revisionism and 
concluded with that country and Austria the Rome Protocols of 1934 which rendered 
some weight to Mussolini’s advice to Budapest. Boško Hristić, Yugoslav minister in 
Rome, relayed Stojadinović’s prediction that Hungary and Poland would be involved 
in a crisis, resulting in «the creation of a small Czech state with a neutral character», 
and the assurance that Yugoslav policy would conform with that of Italy50. Stojadinović 
was effective in his pandering to the special relationship with Rome. Ciano found his 
willingness to coordinate policy in the Czechoslovak crisis «remarkable» and con-
cluded that he was «right» in keeping out of trouble51. This was a major theme during 
their third meeting in Venice in June 1938 when Stojadinović pleaded with the Italians 
to use their «influence to prevent Hungary from taking the initiative in the attack»52. 
48 Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji, ur. D. Cvetković, v. 10, Sovjeti, Britanija i Jugoslavija 1940-41, Paris 1958, p. 7; also 
M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 259.
49 M. Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt, cit., pp. 497-503. D. Denda, Šlem i šajkača, cit., pp. 284-295. For a book-length 
analysis of Belgrade’s attitude towards the Anschluss, see S. Mićić, Kraljevina Jugoslavija i Anšlus Austrije 1938. 
godine, Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2010.
50 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, cit., pp. 200-201.
51 Ciano’s Diary, cit., p. 81.
52 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, cit., pp. 212-216. For Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in connection with the Munich 
crisis, see V. Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941, Narodna knjiga, Beograd 1976, pp. 289-300.
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A month later the Italians met Stojadinović’s request. Both Mussolini and Ciano 
did their best to reassure the Hungarian prime minister, Béla Imrédy, and foreign 
minister, Kálmán Kánya, during their visit to Rome that they had nothing to fear 
of Yugoslavia unless Hungary attacked Czechoslovakia before Germany had done 
so53. In the midst of the Munich crisis, however, Stojadinović turned to Germany to 
protect Yugoslav interests. He appealed to Göring not just to halt Budapest’s action, 
but also to prevent the establishment of the common Polish-Hungarian border which 
would considerably increase the territory and prestige of Hungary54. It was clear that 
Italy would not have the deciding role in settling the new map of central Europe. 
But the growing territorial ambitions of Hungary made Ciano and Mussolini doubt 
the wisdom of extending their full support to Budapest. Fearing that Hungary might 
facilitate Germany’s outlet to the Adriatic, they concluded that it was necessary to 
maintain close relations with Belgrade55. As for Stojadinović, the Munich agreement 
confirmed his foreign policy vision, since at no other time had Yugoslavia’s interna-
tional position been stronger. He maintained equidistance from both political blocs 
and played a subtle diplomatic game in respect to the Axis ‒ close relations with Ger-
many and Italy served to offset the pressure from both powers, the more immediate 
from Rome and the more distant, but more dangerous, from Berlin. 
The last episode in Stojadinović’s dealings with Italy took place in January 1939 
when Ciano arrived in Yugoslavia to discuss the Italian intention to occupy Albania. 
In view of the importance attached to the Yugoslav friendship, Mussolini decided 
to proceed only in agreement, and even in cooperation, with Yugoslavia for which 
he was prepared to offer territorial compensation in nothern Albania. Stojadinović 
did not give a definite reply, but political and military leaderships in Belgrade bus-
ied themselves with studying the situation; the prevailing opinion was, in line with 
traditional Albanian policy, that it was less of an evil to divide Albania than to let 
Italy take the whole of the country56. To prove his intention to follow Italy’s lead, 
Stojadinović announced Yugoslavia’s de facto abandonment of the League of Na-
tions in May that year by withdrawing the delegates from Geneva. In addition, 
he promised to examine the adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially if 
Germany favoured it. This reflected the recent German success in the international 
arena and it was the least Yugoslavia could do to show her favourable attitude to-
wards the Axis short of a definite commitment. It should be noted that Ciano had 
no compunction to make his official report more flattering to his achievement and 
more to Duce’s liking. He recorded, inter alia, that Stojadinović «stated that he was 
completely calm as far as the internal situation and his personal position were con-
cerned». In fact, the contrary was the case: Ciano observed in his diary, not to be 
read by Mussolini, that the Yugoslav premier was «careful about his relations with 
53 Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, cit., pp. 227-229.
54 J. Hoptner, Jugoslavija u krizi, cit., pp. 141-142.
55 Ciano’s Diary, cit., pp. 138-139.
56 D. Bakić, The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919-1939, in «Diplomacy & State-
craft», v. 25, n. 4, 2014, pp. 592-612.
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the monarchy, which do not seem good»57. Apart from his considerable ego, this can 
only be explained by Ciano’s personal political investment in the Belgrade Pact and 
his working relationship with Stojadinović.
Fascistisation and the Downfall of the Stojadinović Regime 
The origins of Stojadinović’s reputation of a fascist-in-the making lay in the 
propaganda of his political adversaries. Stojadinović was labeled a fascist by the 
illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but their voice was not influential, apart 
from stemming from their crude stigmatisation of every single cabinet, and the Yu-
goslav monarchy as such, as the “monarchical-fascist dictatorship”. The communist 
view became important only after the war when it was translated into the official 
historiography, as has been mentioned at the beginning of this essay. Of the Serbian 
democratic opposition, Dragoljub Jovanović was the first to mount an attack on 
Stojadinović’s foreign policy as early as February 1937, i.e. before the conclusion 
of the friendship treaty with Italy. He pointed out the emergence of the anti-demo-
cratic and fascist front in Europe and concluded that whoever claimed to be neutral 
was «in fact on the side of fascism, which is in the position of an attacker»58. This 
was not surprising in view of the left-wing Agrarians’ foreign policy vision, favour-
ing a «Russo-Franco-English orientation, for democracy, for the Slavdom», with 
little regard for the realities of the latter half of the 1930s.  
It was, however, the concerted campaign of the United Opposition, a coalition of 
Democrats, Agrarians and the faction of Radicals siding with the Main Committee 
of their party ‒ that inflicted most damage to the image of Stojadinović’s JRZ. It 
should be noted that the campaign of the above mentioned parties was especially 
pronounced from October 1937 onwards. The timing is significant for understand-
ing how and why the fascist label came to be used against Stojadinović. By that 
time the Pact of Belgrade had been much hailed in the state-controlled media as a 
great foreign policy success. On the other side, the Serbian opposition parties had 
centred their criticism of the government on the Italian rapprochement and the shift 
in Yugoslav foreign policy, ignoring the realpolitik considerations and appealing 
to the emotional sympathy of the people for their allies from the Great War. «Mr. 
Stojadinović’s government has accepted the initiative from Rome and Berlin the 
sole purpose of which is to detach Yugoslavia from her earlier foreign policy sys-
tem, and in the spirit of that new policy they have concluded bilateral pacts and 
agreements outside the framework of the League of Nations, the policy of France 
and England, which base the maintenance of peace on the collective security», read 
57 Ciano’s Diary, cit., p. 179; Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, cit., pp. 267-272. For Stojadinović’s accounts, see AJ, 
Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, private, 21-01-1939, scans 527-530 and 20-01-1939, scans 
534-541; M. Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt, cit., pp. 566-574.
58 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-22-156, ‘Spoljna politika Stojadinovićeve vlade’, 6-2-1937.
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a declaration signed by the leaders of Radicals, Democrats and Agrarians59. The 
United Opposition also criticised the terms of the friendship treaties concluded with 
Italy and Bulgaria (in January 1937). It was a mark of their determination to score 
political points on account of Stojadinović’s unpopular foreign policy that they 
used the occasion of the visit of the French foreign minister, Delbos, to Belgrade in 
December 1937 to stir dissatisfaction among the people60. 
In addition to the invective in the realm of foreign affairs, the United Oppo-
sition accused the government of organising their own «storm detachments» and 
threatened that terror would be met with force61. Moreover, the opposition leaders 
adressed Radenko Stanković, one of the three members of regency (of which only 
Prince Paul mattered), with the warning that JRZ was «forming combat organisa-
tions from their members, dressing them in uniforms, and intend, as we have re-
ceived reports, to arm them as well, and to start a fight with such organised, uni-
formed and armed detachments»62. They referred, in fact, to the youth organisation 
of JRZ which was about to hold a grand congress in Belgrade and demonstrate the 
mass appeal of Stojadinović’s party. As will be discussed later, a relatively modest 
number of the JRZ youth would indeed wear uniforms, but there were certainly no 
plans for the formation of the party storm troops, whether armed or not, on the pat-
tern of the youth detachments in Italy and Germany. 
But there was another important development that informed, to a large extent, 
the campaign against the JRZ government. The three Serbian opposition parties 
concluded an agreement with Maček and his political allies on 8 October 1937 in 
the village of Farkašić, demanding restoration of the full political liberties, revi-
sion of the 1931 constitution and rearrangement of Yugoslavia’s internal structure 
on the basis of a consensus between the majority of Serbs, majority of Croats and 
majority of Slovenes63. This development, in particular, allowed the Serbian United 
Opposition to pose as a champion of democracy and to raise the prospect of solving 
the Croatian question by democratic means ‒ although Maček was, unlike them, 
only concerned with the Croatian settlement and would drop his partners in 1939 to 
make a deal with the Crown. Nevertheless, the Serbian opposition was seemingly 
able to offer a coherent political strategy and to attack the JRZ regime on grounds 
of both foreign and domestic policy. The accusations of distancing from France, 
Britain and the Little Entente were now coupled with incrimination for the growing 
59 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-60, Declaration signed by Aca Stanojević, Ljubomir Davidović and Jovan 
Jovanović, 2-4-1937.
60 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-60, Leaflet titled “Delbos u Beogradu” with the statement of the United Opposi-
tion leaders dated 11-12-1937 and the press clips describing the clash between the pro-French demonstrators and 
the police in the streets of Belgrade.
61 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-60, Anonymous leaflet, 10-10-1937; also “Obaveštenje građanima Beograda” 
signed by “Akcioni odbor građana”, October 1937.
62 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-60, Jovan Jovanović, Ljubomir Davidović and Miloš Trifunović (on behalf of 
Aca Stanojević) to Radenko Stanković, 20-10-1937.   
63 T. Stojkov, O stvaranju Bloka narodnog sporazuma, in «Istorija 20. veka», v. 6, 1964, pp. 245-301; M. 
Radojević, Udružena opozicija 1935-1939, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1964, pp. 176-181.
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fascistisation at home, the most visible sign of which was the emergence of the uni-
formed JRZ formations allegedly prepared for violence against their political oppo-
nents64. Despite the weak foundations of their agreement with the HSS, the Serbian 
opposition thus wielded a powerful slogan among the democratically-minded, pre-
dominantly anti-German, and much less anti-Italian, Serbian population: for peace 
and democracy, against totalitarian aggressiveness and fascism in Yugoslavia as-
sociated with Stojadinović and his party.
This begs the question whether there was substance to the accusations against 
Stojadinović. To begin with, it is clear that the JRZ cannot be considered a fascist 
organisation according to the most influential theories of fascism expounded by 
Roger Griffin and Stanley Payne. Starting from his “new consensus”, an approach 
which prioritizes fascist ideology over structures and points out that generic fascism 
was a transnational phenomenon, Griffin defined fascism as revolutionary political 
ideology «whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of 
populist ultra-nationalism», which separates fascism from conservative and radi-
cal/extreme far right65. Payne’s different, but complementary, theoretical paradigm 
considers a movement fascist if it meets certain criteria: «common points of ideol-
ogy and goals, the fascist negations, and also special common features of style and 
organization»66. In his typology of authoritarian nationalist interwar right, Payne 
distinguishes between the fascist right, radical right and conservative right. Accord-
ing to such approach, the JRZ regime was no doubt firmly placed on the conserva-
tive section of the right-wing political spectrum. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied 
that the Stojadinović government displayed certain fascist trappings, indicating 
the interwar dynamics between the “old”, conservative and radical, “new” right. 
António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis have offered a fresh perspective on the 
relationship between the conservative and fascist right: they view it as fluid and re-
flexive interaction, involving a (differing) degree of mutual influence and selective 
borrowing, creating different hybrid forms of right-wing politics according to the 
specifics of a particular national setting and, ultimately, leading the conservatives 
towards radicalization of their attitudes and policies67. The Stojadinović regime will 
be analysed here with reference to their theoretical framework in order to assess the 
impact and influence of fascist ideas and practices on the JRZ conservative con-
stituency. It seems most beneficial to look at the conspicuous features immanent to 
fascist studies and recognisable, to some extent, in the JRZ political platform and 
activism such as the youth organization, the workers organisation and fascist style. 
Of special interest is the link between the close Italo-Yugoslav relations and fascis-
64 M. Radojević, Udružena opozicija, cit., pp. 138-139.
65 R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, The Pinter Press, London 1991. The constraints of a space make it impossible 
to engage here more fully with the vast literature in the field of fascism studies.
66 S.G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, Wisconsin Press, Madison 1995.
67 Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, eds. A. Costa Pinto, A. Kallis, Palgrave Macmillan, London 
2014; A. Kallis, Fascism and the Right in Interwar Europe: Interaction, Entanglement, Hybridity, in The Oxford 
Handbook of European History, 1914-1945, ed. N. Doumanis, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, pp. 301-322.
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tisation of the Yugoslav regime, which could provide new insights to Costa Pinto’s 
and Kallis’ theoretical considerations. 
The JRZ had its own student club at the University of Belgrade named the “Slav 
South” (Slovenski jug) which carried on the tradition of the famous pre-1914 or-
ganisation renowned for championing the Yugoslav unification. It was a typical 
student branch of a political party with the main purpose of containing the com-
munist tendencies among the university youth. Resulting from the growing net-
work of student clubs under the aegis of JRZ from universities across the country, 
a congress was held on 11 July 1937 and the Main Committee of the Academic 
Youth of JRZ was elected with Milivoje Đikanović as its president68. In ideological 
terms, the Academic Youth toed the line of the party leadership: they made a solemn 
declaration to «use every legitimate means to fight against all extremists, fascists 
on the most far-right and communists on the most far-left alike, regarding both as 
the imported doctrines, totally alien to our liberal-minded people» and to struggle 
for «true democracy»69. There was certain ambivalence in terms of looking for a 
role model abroad, perhaps reflecting an unspoken assumption that it was neces-
sary not to identify with any single organisation of the same kind. For example, the 
JRZ student congress proposed the launching of courses for the political education 
of their members on the pattern of the academic youth in both Nazi Germany and 
democratic Czechoslovakia70. It was only after Stojadinović’s fall from power that 
the extreme far-right ideas took hold of, and even dominated over, the JRZ student 
organisation71. 
For practical Stojadinović, Slovenski jug was also a convenient means of fa-
cilitating the desirable image of his regime abroad. In step with his direction of 
foreign affairs, it served the purpose of promoting the close Italo-Yugoslav rela-
tions and demonstrating the reception of Italian ideas in Yugoslavia. After the ini-
tial attempts of the leaders of Slovenski  jug to visit Italy had failed for financial 
reasons, Stojadinović put his own authority behind their enterprise. The Italians 
responded immediately and decided to fund the visit. The purpose of the visit was 
to familiarise the Yugoslav students with the work and organisation of the Fascist 
Party, especially with its youth section and to exchange experiences regarding the 
anti-communist struggle. Two groups of twenty students each visited Italy in July 
1938 and the second one was received by Mussolini himself, which ensured wide 
coverage in the Italian press. However, the results of their soujourn were a dismal 
failure. The Yugoslav press attaché in Rome, Miloš Crnjanski, reported that the 
students had made an unfavourable impression and showed little interest in attend-
ing lectures on the organisation of the Fascist Party. They were more interested in 
68 D. Tešić, Klub studenata Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice ‘Slovenski jug’ na Beogradskom univerzitetu 1935-
1941, in «Istorija 20. veka», n. 1-2, 1993, pp. 53-71.
69 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-17-116, Milivoje Đikanović to Milan Stojadinović, 12-7-1937.
70 Ibid.
71 R. Ristanović, Ideološka orijentacija članova Kluba studenata JRZ Slovenski jug, in «Tokovi istorije», n. 1, 
2016, pp. 143-164.
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having a good time and perhaps getting Italian stipends72. If Stojadinović wanted 
to further the impression in Rome that he was progressing towards the formation 
of a fascist-like party youth, the visit fell far short of his intention. A delegation of 
thirty students was also invited to the student manifestations in Germany in June 
1938 and yet another one had been in Greece three months earlier; in return, thirty 
German students spent a month in the Slovenski jug camp in Sutomore73.
Another, more important, form of the youth organisation was the emergence of 
JRZ youth (OJRZ). After setting up JRZ youth branches in Belgrade at the initiative 
of some members of the Executive Committee, the minister of physical education, 
Josip Rogić, proposed on 1 May 1937 the extension of these organisations to the 
entire country, which Stojadinović approved. It was not, however, before 24 Octo-
ber that a large congress of OJRZ took place at a Belgrade football club stadium on 
which occasion Stojadinović delivered a speech74. That event alarmed the opposi-
tion not just because it showed the growing strength of the government party, but 
also as a sign of fascistisation of the country. The opposition youth organisations 
inveighed against the JRZ youth congress as an abuse of young people, proclaimed 
their own commitment to democracy, peace and the agreement between the Serbs 
and Croats, and protested against the rapprochment with the Axis75. But despite the 
fascist flavour of a mass rally, the adopted statutes of OJRZ required of its members 
to cultivate «a sense of civil liberties and political rights of the people and to resist 
communism as well as all the teachings and movements which in practice destroy 
the dignity of a human, his personal and civil liberty»76. Stojadinović seems to have 
been interested in the practical side of the youth organisation as a way of strength-
ening his party. There is no doubt, however, that he was influenced by the Italian 
example. On 2 January 1938, fresh from his visit to Rome, he said that «children 
need to be won over to the party from the age of four, if we want to have the Radical 
youth (Count Ciano has given him that advice)»77.
As has been said, the opposition parties were particularly disconcerted on account 
of the uniform-wearing of the young JRZ members. That feature of a fascist style 
has also retained a strong resonance in all the accounts that suggest Stojadinović 
was prone to totalitarian dictatorship and, therefore, needs to be examined more 
closely. The making of uniforms was indeed connected with the ongoing prepara-
tions for the grand OJRZ rally when prices were tendered for a contract in summer 
1937, as Stojadinović was informed that «there is great interest for the uniforms 
among the youth ranks in the countryside»78. In September, 161 uniforms were or-
72 B. Simić, Posete kluba studenata Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice ‘Slovenski jug’ Italiji 1938. godine, in 
«Tokovi istorije», n. 2, 2011, pp. 81-92.
73 D. Tešić, Klub studenata Jugoslovenske radikalne, cit., p. 66.
74 For details, see D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, cit., pp. 333-346.
75 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-10-61. An undated leaflet distributed by the youth branches of the United Opposi-
tion together with the leftist youth groups.
76 Sabor i kongres omladine Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice, Samouprava, Beograd 1937, p. 55.
77 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 159.
78 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-16-105, Milutin Krivokapić to Milan Stojadinović, 11-8-1937.
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dered for those youngsters designated to guard the JRZ rallies; a group of them 
also wore the same uniforms on the occasion of the visit of Turkish prime minister, 
Celâl Bayar, to Yugoslavia. After May 1938, these uniforms, in fact 76 which had 
been made as there were problems with the quality of work, were handed over to 
Slovenski jug on the basis of a decision of the Main Committee of OJRZ79. Partly 
remade and partly newly tailored, the uniforms were meant for students visiting 
Italy and Germany and two of them were earmarked for the occasions of the party 
manifestations. «Since there is a general feeling in the Club that all members get 
their uniforms and the membership has been increasing remarkably, especially this 
academic year», the president of Slovenski jug, Dušan Janković, requested another 
98 uniforms for students80. The numbers do not quite match as some uniforms were 
remade to fit the size or provided material for caps (šajkače), but 160 were at the 
disposal of the student club on 1 December 1938. Janković needed more to meet the 
demand and suggested that a new order be placed with a tailor who made uniforms 
for OJRZ and proved himself more dutiful and efficient that the one he had worked 
with earlier. The need for uniforms must have grown considerably with the coming 
of the general elections set for 11 December 1938, since the young party members 
were expected to accompany Stojadinović and secure the rallies. A major order was 
placed the details of which are unknown, but Stojadinović was informed less than 
three weeks before the elections that «the second thousand» of uniforms had been 
completed and their distribution had already started81.   
Despite this expansion in the number of uniforms, it cannot be said that 
Stojadinović pushed for a full-scale fascistisation of his party youth, even in terms 
of their appearance. He decided that uniforms were not compulsory and that sports-
men alone should wear them in order to create an impression and inspire pride 
in having them. Stojadinović insisted on the fact that the initiative for uniform-
wearing in Italy and Germany had come from the poorest to make them appear the 
same as the rich; paradoxically, given the historical background, he concluded that 
a uniform was «in fact, a democratic institution»82. Stojadinović’s views informed 
the practice of dressing the party youth. All members of OJRZ were only obliged 
to wear the party youth badges. Outside the sport venues, the members of sport 
teams, whom Stojadinović was particularly supportive of, wore uniforms if they 
chose so and paid for it83. The appropriate uniforms were mandatory for those who 
followed Stojadinović during his journeys accross the country, were present at the 
79 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-16-105, Petar Marjanović to Jovan Marković, 4-10-1938; Radoslav Ilkić to Milan 
Stojadinović, 28-9-1938.
80 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-17-117, Dušan Janković to Milan Stojadinović, 4-10-1938 with the documents 
attached. It was some of the students selected to go to Italy who «expressed their wish» to bring uniforms (AJ, 
Stojadinović Papers, 37-17-117, Dušan Janković to Milan Stojadinović, 29-4-1938).
81 АЈ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-16-105, Josip Rogić [President of the Main Committee of OJRZ] to Milan Stoja-
dinović, 23-11-1938. For a disscussion of the use of uniforms, see B. Simić, Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića, 
Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd 2007, pp. 275-278.
82 АЈ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-16-115, Milan Stojadinović to Ranko Dostanić, 7-9-1938.
83 D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, cit., p. 345.
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official reception of the visiting statesmen and securing the party rallies during the 
1938 elections (which would prove significant, as will be seen later). Overall, their 
number was modest and seems to have never exceeded three hundreds, as estimated 
during Ciano’s visit in January 1939. It should also be noted that on the European 
scale uniform-wearing was a widespread craze and by no means confined to fascist 
or far-right groups84. Although sufficient to draw fire from the political opponents, 
especially in Serbia, the practice of uniform dressing seems to have reflected the 
fact that OJRZ was far from the mass movement like those in Italy and Germany. 
In fact, it was not organised on a larger scale, or more militarised, than other par-
ty formations in Yugoslavia such as Maček’s Croatian Peasant Defence (Hrvat-
ska seljačka zaštita) and Croatian Civil Defence (Hrvatska građanska zaštita), or 
Korošec’s fanti. It was certainly a far cry from the single-state EON organisation 
in the less populated Greece under the Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship with its no less 
than 600,000 members85. 
Yet another example of the Italian (and German) inspiration at home was the 
establishment of the Yugoslav Workers Association (Jugoslovenski radnički savez-
Jugoras). Starting from professional associations within JRZ, it was formed on 26 
July 1936 under the authority of Dragiša Cvetković, minister of social policy. He 
summed up the rationale for the creation of Jugoras in a major speech a month and 
a half later: «Instead of the [Third] International, instead of Marxism, we must lead 
our workers movement on the basis of our conditions, on the basis of our customs 
and economic position»86. With the growing number of Jugoras branches, the JRZ 
leadership decided to hold a large congress of the organisation on 25-26 April 1938. 
Stojadinović addressed the crowd himself stressing the importance of the event. 
For Jovanović-Stoimirović, Stojadinović’s speech was “fascist”. «He has thundered 
against socialism and communism, and delivered the phrase in which he said, urbi 
et orbi, what he wanted: a dictatorship for the next few years, because he said he 
wanted to unite all the constructive forces etc»87. The “Rules” of Jugoras were also 
adopted on that occasion, which proclaimed it the sole legitimate workers repre-
sentative through which the government could execute their  social and economic 
programme; such tendency was coupled with the request to take over all agencies 
for workers protection from the hands of marxist syndicates88. Just like in the OJRZ, 
uniform-wearing was introduced in Jugoras. The extent of that practice is impos-
sible to trace, but given the case of the party youth organisations it could hardly 
amount to much. Nevertheless, it served Stojadinović’s opponents well enough as 
another example of his fascistisation of Yugoslavia. He was later adamant that it 
84 J.F. Fuentes, Shirt Movements in Interwar Europe: a Totalitarian Fashion, in «Ler História», v. 72, 2018, pp. 
151-173.
85 A. Kallis, Neither Fascist nor Authoritarian: The 4th of August Regime in Greece (1936-1941) and the Dynamics 
of Fascistisation in 1930s Europe, in «East Central Europe», n. 2-3, 2010, pp. 317-320.
86 D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, cit., pp. 318-321.
87 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 183.
88 Prvi zemaljski kongres Jugoslovenskog radničkog saveza, Jugoras, Beograd 1938, p. 69.
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had been Cvetković’s, and not his own, initiative to dress the JRZ workers in blue 
uniforms89.      
Along with anti-communist and nationalist rhetoric, the discourse on Jugoras was 
increasingly resembling the corporatist themes of Fascist Italy with its insistence on 
the harmonious collaboration between the classes instead of class struggle. It is not 
surprising then that Stojadinović did not fail to make use of Jugoras to foster the 
image of close cooperation with Italy. In September 1938, at the time of the Munich 
crisis, the Jugoras delegation visited Venice, Milano, Torino, Rome and Florence to 
see some of the important industrial facilities, institutes and fascist organisations. 
A number of Italian officials received the Yugoslav workers, including Ciano. The 
visit was a success, unlike that of the JRZ students. This time Crnjanski informed 
the Yugoslav premier that the reception of the delegation was excellent among both 
the officials and the public. To mark his satisfaction, Stojadinović received the 
workers on their return to Belgrade to hear their impressions and instructed Hristić 
to thank Ciano on his behalf90. But for all this fanfare, corporatism made no progress 
that would tabgibly affect economy and social structure in Yugoslavia.
The fascist trappings of the Stojadinović regime manifested themselves in a 
much more conspicuous manner during the campaign for the 11 December elec-
tions. Importantly, Stojadinović called the elections in the wake of Czechoslova-
kia’s dismemberment in Munich, calculating that his foreign policy would be a 
major asset. Even before the elections, in May 1938, a group of JRZ members had 
prepared a proposal for carrying out party propaganda, criticising the old primitive 
approach and drawing inspiration from Fascist Italy. The gist of the proposal con-
cerned the application of methods that proved successful in Italy. The admiration 
to the Italian «new type of organising political life», the general tenor of sugges-
tions, especially the one for the formation of a secret party police responsible to the 
head of the party alone, smacked of fascism91. The only signature attached to the 
document is that of Milutin Krivokapić, vice-president of the Main Committee of 
OJRZ, which might indicate that the impulse for fascistisation was coming from the 
younger generation prone to perceiving themselves as the “new men” suited to the 
new age marked by the rise of fascism. Much more certain is the fact that the more 
extreme, fascist-like suggestions were not adopted, but those concerning the practi-
cal side of propaganda served as the basis of the soon-to-be-made manual for the 
party activists and were put into practice during the election campaign92.
Once the election campaign began, Stojadinović held the first out of his nine ma-
jor rallies in the JRZ office in Belgrade on 16 October. He had no qualms about ad-
89 M. Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt, cit., p. 589.
90 B. Simić, Milan Stojadinović i Italija, cit., pp. 169-171.
91 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-12-81, ‘Predlog za partijsku propagandu’, 8-5-1938, attached to Milutin Krivokapić 
to Milan Stojadinović, without date. This document is also discussed in D. Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna za-
jednica, cit., pp. 198-200.
92 Uputstvo za praktično izvođenje partijske propagande, Beograd 1938.
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mitting to Prince Paul that the staging of the event had been «entirely à la Hitler»93. 
In Petrovgrad, the fascist flair was even more pronounced because the rally was 
held out in the open, with the Yugoslav premier arriving in a car surrounded with 
motorcyclists. Jovanović-Stoimirović has recorded with displeasure that it was 
there that «the fascist organisation of Stojadinović’s guard emerged at once, sud-
denly and loudly. The uniformed members of the party yelled “Leader, Leader!” 
[…] All in all, the people did not like it. They voiced disapproval, and serious, dig-
nified at that»94. But the same staging was repeated in Novi Sad on 13 November on 
an even larger scale. According to the German minister in Yugoslavia, Viktor von 
Heeren, that rally was a grand expression of the authoritarian character with which 
Stojadinović imbued his party95. 
It was hardly coincidence that the fascist iconography was most conspicuous 
at the two rallies held in northern part of Serbia/Yugoslavia (Petrovgrad and Novi 
Sad) which was populated by considerable German (and Hungarian) minority. 
Stojadinović killed two birds with one stone: he demonstrated his inclination to fas-
cist methods before Berlin and Rome, and secured the votes of the local Germans. 
He was not aware of the fact that Berlin had signalled the German minority to cast 
their votes for JRZ, although he might have expected it. He toned down the fascist 
colouring of his campaign in the two towns of what is nowadays Serbia, Negotin 
and Šabac. For example, seventy members of OJRZ traveled to the rally in Petro-
vgrad ‒ forty from Belgrade accompanying Stojadinović and thirty from Vršac ‒ 
as opposed to twenty-six Belgraders who went to the rally in Negotin, in eastern 
Serbia, although the two rallies were not that much different in terms of attendance 
(40,000 and 30,000 respectively)96. Moreover, Stojadinović did not organise a large 
rally in a single town in Šumadija, Serbia’s heartland, since he knew that aping of 
fascist methods there would not be well received among the Serbian peasants. This 
is an interesting example that can contribute to Costa Pinto’s and Kallis’ concept 
of the transnational transfer of fascist ideas and practice affecting the conservative 
constituency. The election campaign of JRZ can certainly be understood in those 
terms, but Stojadinović clearly manipulated the use of fascist technique to achive 
a foreign policy goal which also benefited him domestically during the elections.
Stojadinović won the elections, but his lead over the opposition bloc headed by 
Maček was less than impressive. Although he was surprised and dissapointed, it 
seemed that he could continue in office as long as Prince Regent supported him. But 
Stojadinović’s electoral flirtation with fascist iconography undermined the confi-
dence Prince Paul had placed in him. A later inquiry revealed that the Novi Sad rally 
had alarmed the regent. Prince Paul complained to the chief of the Belgrade police, 
93 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 16-10-1938, scans 568-573.
94 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 216.
95 D. Biber, O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade, cit., p. 42.
96 AJ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-16-105, Josip Rogić to Jovan Marković, 4-11-1938; Josip Rogić to Jovan Marković, 
5-11-1938. For the estimates of the crowd in different places, see J. Opra, Izborna kampanja Milana Stojadinovića 
1938. godine, in «Arhiv: časopis Arhiva Jugoslavije», n. 2, 2001, p. 176.
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Milan Aćimović, about the crowd hailing Stojadinović as the Leader. «What am I 
then?», he said97. This is consistent with the regent’s utterance to his close friend, an 
art historian Milan Kašanin, to the effect that he removed Stojadinović because of 
his ambition to become «a second Duce» and to protect the crown for the sake of his 
young cousin, Petar II98. Prince Paul was determined not to allow the Karađorđević 
dynasty to suffer the fate of the House of Savoy. Based on Prince Paul’s conversa-
tion with the British minister, Ronald Campbell, it is clear that he had made his 
mind to drop Stojadinović from the government by mid-January 193999. Then came 
Ciano’s visit, as discussed above, and the sight of some 300 uniformed members 
of OJRZ saluting the Italian foreign minister at the train station further discredited 
Stojadinović in the eyes of the Crown. This manifestation was not wasted on Ciano 
as an evidence of fascistisation, especially as he did not notice that the same 300 
young men greeted him again in the JRZ office and on several other occassions dur-
ing his visit100. But that little spectacle served Stojadinović to buttress his utterance 
to the effect that he modelled JRZ on the Fascist Party.
In fact, the shirted JRZ youth lined up to be seen by Ciano encapsulated the es-
sence of Stojadinović’s playing with fascist motifs: just like his youth and workers 
organisations, it lacked a true conviction, but was rather geared towards producing 
the effect and conveying the political message he believed to have been opportune. 
In that sense, this particular transmission of fascist style did not simply stem from 
the Italian influence as part of the unconscious borrowing from a model which 
seemed attractive because of its apparent political success; it was a performance 
for the specific purpose of Ciano’s visit to Yugoslavia, a feigned act which served 
the needs of Yugoslav foreign policy. Unfortunately for Stojadinović, his tête-à-
tête with Ciano made the Regent even more suspicious of him. As Milan Antić, the 
court minister, put it, the talks between Ciano and the Yugoslav premier were ‘the 
last drop of poison in the relations between the Prince and Stojadinović’101. It seems 
almost fantastic that Prince Paul came to suspect his own premier of plotting with 
the Italians with a view to ceding western non-Serb parts of Yugoslavia to Rome 
and creating a Greater Serbia, incorporating northern Albania and Thessaloniki, in 
which Stojadinović would realise his intention to rule as a fascist dictator102. Ap-
parently, one suspicion bred another, but it is likely that Stojadinović’s opponents, 
of which Antić was certainly one, must have worked hard against him at the court. 
Once convinced that Stojadinović was bent on establishing his own totalitarian dic-
tatorship, it appeared logical to Prince Paul that he would make full use of his 
97 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 377.
98 K. Dimitrijević, Vreme zabrana, Prometej, Beograd 1991, p. 288. For more evidence, see D. Biber, O padu 
Stojadinovićeve vlade, cit., pp. 47-50; also D. Đorđević, Na raskrsnici ’41: prilozi za srpsku istoriju Drugog 
svetskog rata, Dečje novine, Gornji Milanovac 1991, p. 114.
99 Ž. Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, v. 3, 1939-1941, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd 1996, 53.
100 D. Gregorić, Samoubistvo Jugoslavije: poslednji čin jugoslovenske tragedije, Jugoistok, Beograd 1942, p. 53.
101 Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, ref. no. 14387/8734, Antić’s undated note; J. Hoptner, 
Jugoslavija u krizi, cit., pp. 126-127.
102 D. Biber, O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade, cit., pp. 16-19.
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cordial relations with Italy for that purpose. The Regent engineered the crisis of the 
cabinet and Stojadinović resigned on 4 February 1939. 
Out of Office and Out of Yugoslavia 
After his fall from power, Stojadinović and a number of his supporters were 
expelled from JRZ in July 1939. His opposition to the Dragiša Cvetković govern-
ment centred on his refusal to accept the (con)federalisation of the country in order 
to reach an agreement with Maček. Stojadinović was not a true supporter of King 
Alexander’s integral Yugoslavism, but he was in favour of an integral (meaning 
unitary) Yugoslavia. In February 1940, he founded the short-lived Serbian Radical 
Party on that basis, which was liberal-democratic in its outlook. In the realm of for-
eign affairs, he did not shy away from suggesting that neutral Yugoslavia should es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the Second 
World War103. It was perhaps no wonder then that Jovanović-Stoimirović, his earlier 
propagandist, started to think that «Stojadinović does not know what he wants. He 
used to want to be a successor of Pašić, then he lurched into fascism, and now he 
jumps from fascism into democracy»104.  
With this in view, it is interesting to note that his fascist label stuck to Stojadinović 
even during this later period and remained unshaken in much of historiography. 
This in part resulted from the continued tarnishing of his reputation on the part 
of his successor, and soon bitter political opponent, Cvetković: to justify his own 
policy and discredit Stojadinović, the new prime minister presented him as having 
slided to fascism during his premiership105. Prince Paul and Cvetković were both 
afraid that Berlin and Rome could press for Stojadinović’s return to power on the 
grounds of their confidence in his friendly attitude towards the Axis. For that rea-
son, and to keep him quiet about the Croatian issue, they interned him barely two 
months after he had formed the Serbian Radical Party. Despite the eleven months 
of his complete isolation, concern about Stojadinović culminated in the run-up to 
Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and on 18 March 1941, just ten days 
prior to the signing, Prince Paul handed him to the British in contravention of the 
Yugoslav constitution. Since Churchill was anxious at that time to draw Yugoslavia 
into the war, he saw Stojadinović as «a potential Quisling» and extended his full 
assistance to have him transported to Mauritius where he remained until 1948 un-
der the watchful eye of the British colonial administration106. It was a bitter irony 
103 For documents concerning this part of his political career, see B. Nadoveza, Srpska radikalna stranka Milana 
Stojadinovića, Srpska radikalna stranka, Beograd 2006.
104 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 368.
105 АЈ, Stojadinović Papers, 37-12-79, unsigned record of the 9 July 1939 meeting of the JRZ Main Committee; 
M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 294.
106 D. Biber, Britanske ocjene Stojadinovića i njegove politike, in Fašizam i neofašizam, Fakultet političkih nauka, 
Zagreb 1975, pp. 265-277.
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that after the coup d’état on 27 March which refuted Yugoslavia’s adherence to the 
Tripartite Pact just two days earlier, the putchists handed Prince Paul and his family 
to the British ‒ they were interned in Kenya and the Regent was long disparaged as 
having deceived his British friends. This clearly shows the absurdity of taking the 
not disinterested official British assessments of either Stojadinović or Prince Paul 
for granted.  
From 1948 to his death in 1961 Stojadinović lived in Argentina where he started 
the eminent «El Economista» journal, arguably his most enduring legacy. Work-
ing as an economic adviser to the provincial and central government, painting and 
writing his memoirs, he was not politically active like so many other Serbian and 
Croatian exiles. Therefore, it sent shockwaves when he concluded an agreement 
with the most famous of them all, the Ustaša leader of the Nazi-puppet Independ-
ent State of Croatia during WWII, Ante Pavelić, responsible for the genocide com-
mitted against the Serbs, Jews and Roma, in 1954. The two exiles agreed on the 
formation of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia on the ruins of Josip Broz 
Tito’s communist Yugoslavia. This act had no impact on Yugoslavia whatsoever, 
but it was a devastating blow for Stojadinović’s standing among the Serbs. The 
background of that episode became known much later, although not in detail. Tito’s 
secret service (UDBA) contacted Stojadinović from the early 1950’s onwards with 
a view to enlisting his services against the Ustaša exiles in Argentina ‒ it should be 
noted that Pavelić’s dealing with the former Yugoslav prime minister undermined 
his authority over the Ustaša movement ‒ using his financial strings and keeping 
under control the hostile attitude of the Serb exiles; in return, Stojadinović’s brother 
Dragomir was released from prison and joined him in Buenos Aires, and life was 
made easier for his ill sister in Belgrade107. The episode once again demonstrates 
Stojadinović’s pragmatism, since he had no illusions about the imminent collapse 
of the Tito regime, unlike many of his exiled compatriots. 
***
In retrospect, Stojadinović pointed out the absurdity of imagining him as a fascist 
leader in multinational Yugoslavia108. There might have possibly emerged a Serbian 
fascist dictator, or a Croatian (Pavelić became one during the war), or a Slovenian 
one, but he was no doubt correct that there could not have been a Yugoslav Leader. 
This was obvious to other political personalities as well, for example to Korošec 
who claimed a month before the 11 December elections that “there were not ele-
107 Historical Archive of the City of Belgrade, BIA [Security Intelligence Agency] files, Milan Stojadinović Do-
sier. This material was published in 2005 in the «Novosti» newspaper under the title Milan Stojadinović u tajnom 
Arhivu UDBE, https://www.novosti.rs/feljton/455/milan-stojadinovic-u-tajnom-arhivu-udbe. Bogdan Krizman 
has given an account based on the Serbian and Croatian émigré press in his Pavelić u bjekstvu, Globus, Zagreb 
1986, pp. 261-288. The best reconstruction of this controversial episode can be found in M. Đurković, Uvod: 
enigma Milana Stojadinovića, in Milan Stojadinović: politika u vreme globalnih lomova, cit., pp. 21-26.
108 M. Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt, cit., p. 589.
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ments for fascism” in Yugoslavia because it was impossible to find a single leader 
for the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina109. Besides, the 
case of Dimitrije Ljotić, the leader of fascist ZBOR, which propounded Yugoslav 
nationalism, although most of its supporters were Serbs, and could not garner more 
than one per cent of votes at the 1935 and 1938 elections, was self-explanatory. On 
the other hand, the allegation that Stojadinović fancied himself as a fascist Serb dic-
tator following the break-up of Yugoslavia is based on nothing more than rumours 
and speculations110. Had he been playing with such ideas, their realization would 
have required Italy’s consent and participation and Ciano would have surely known 
and made some mention of it. With these considerations in view, Stojadinović 
emerges as a typical conservative politician who found himself caught up in the 
era of fascist expansion. The fascist traits in the later phase of his premiership seem 
rather superficial and brought no real change in the political and social structure of 
the authoritarian Yugoslav monarchy. On closer examination, his flirtation with fas-
cist trappings was a pragmatic, and even cynical, response to Yugoslavia’s foreign 
policy requirements in the international environment increasingly dominated by the 
Axis powers. It was all mostly window dressing effectively employed to cultivate 
relations with Rome and Berlin. In terms of Costa Pinto’s and Kallis’ theoretical 
framework, the case of the Stojadinović era in Yugoslavia points to the need to pay 
attention to the interplay between political pragmatism, especially in foreign af-
fairs, and the extent of the real social and political transformations with a view to 
coming to a more reliable assessment whose developments might be regarded as 
genuine fascistisation.
109 M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, cit., p. 206.
110 The origins of those are impossible to trace. Korošec said that Prince Paul was angry with Stojadinović after 
having found out during his visit to Rome in mid-1939 that the latter had allegedly «given statements» according 
to his own lights concerning the amputation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. (M. Jovanović-Stoimirović, Dnevnik, 
cit., p. 282). For the regent’s utterance, most often cited is I. Meštrović, Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje, 
Knjižnica Hrvatske revije, Buenos Aires 1961, pp. 290-291.
